

19 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McCONE

1. Attached is a memorandum from McGeorge Bundy with the proposed public announcement on the XRF aircraft.

2. I am meeting with [] this afternoon and perhaps with Wheelon and [] I have already met with Wheelon, Cunningham, and []. They are preparing for me a number of proposed courses of action that must be taken in order to follow through on the President's decision. These actions will be designed to protect the security of the Agency assets in all particulars. They will, of course, be fully discussed with you when ready.

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3. As to the proposed press release itself, it would be helpful if those portions I have bracketed could be deleted, especially if we wish to make every effort to keep the Agency involvement secret.

4. For your personal information, the underlined portion of Mac Bundy's memorandum is a matter of concern to me. I have no doubt that the Agency to a man will respect the President's wishes, but I cannot guarantee that other less respectful people will refrain from violating the President's desires in this regard.

5. Finally, I would hope that the President would not make any release until all of us are absolutely certain we have all the ends buttoned up and have planned for every possible contingency -- it may well be that a week is inadequate to insure that all witting persons are alerted and to get Congressional leadership (particularly the loyal opposition), newspaper publishers, etc., entirely clued in in advance.

NSC review completed.

MSC:bec

M. S. C.

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Orig - DCI (by hand by Gen. C.)

1 - DDCI (w/surfacing papers)

1 - Mr. Cunningham(?) by hand by Gen. C.

1 - O/ASDCS L.D.

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[]

for my information

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14 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group (5412) Meeting at 1600 on 13 February

1. Present were Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Alexis Johnson, Mr. Mann, General Carter, Mr. FitzGerald, and Peter Jessup. General Taylor and Mr. FitzGerald were present only for the Cuban item.

2. Prior to the arrival of Mr. Bundy, General Taylor mentioned to Mr. Alexis Johnson an upcoming trip of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Norfolk, Fort Bragg, and Panama. After some jocular bantering, Mr. Johnson vetoed the Panama portion of the trip, with General Taylor hoping that this denial was purely for the physical protection of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Mr. McCone mentioned the possibility that he might go to Saigon next week to see what was going on out there. He stated that we were not getting sufficient timely information from the Ambassador and that while he and Mr. McNamara might be going out later as a follow-up to their December trip, he felt the need to go now. General Taylor pointed out that there have been a great many visitors to Saigon in recent months and perhaps we should give them a rest out there for a while. In any event, he thought perhaps the newly-created NSAM committee headed by Sullivan would want to make such a trip. General Taylor seemed reluctant to have Mr. McCone go at this time. Mr. Johnson said he would take a look at it and be in touch with Mr. McCone early next week.

4. The first item on the agenda was a discussion of the Vance memo of 10 February on "Clandestine and Covert Activities Against Cuba." Mr. Vance stated that he was strongly for this course of action, that the risks were minimal, and that

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[REDACTED]

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the JCS and Secretary McNamara also strongly supported it. Mr. Johnson pointed out that he would be much happier if the paper had been sent to the Cuban Coordinating Committee in accordance with usual procedures. Mr. Vance stated that the committee knows all about it and are for it. Mr. McCone stated that he was disturbed over the trend of events in Cuba and that this particular paper really does not go far enough. He pointed out that our economic denial program was eroding away and that the courses of action proposed by Mr. Vance's memo gave Castro maximum grounds for righteous indignation without really accomplishing anything. Mr. Vance stated that prior activities in this regard had created great consternation in Cuba, and Bundy challenged this and asked for proof. Mr. McCone pointed out the many times that we have had to stand down actions of this type in order to avoid raising the noise level. General Taylor said that what we really must do is to reaffirm the belief of the senior policy makers to the President that a program of this type must be continued. Mr. Bundy pointed out that the Secretary of Defense had previously stated to the President, along with Secretary Rusk, that they were not enthusiastic for this type of activity but he noted now that Mr. McNamara had reversed his position. Bundy pointed out that we have been somewhat hesitant to go ahead full force on these actions because we did not want to prejudice our position before the OAS in connection with the Venezuelan arms cache. Mann stated that our entire program as regards Cuba was ineffective insofar as it could result in any overthrow of Castro.

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[REDACTED] Bundy stated that the low risk actions appear unrewarding and that rewarding actions have too high a risk. Mann stated that we need to do a lot more homework before the next OAS meeting (presently unscheduled) and Bundy said in any event we must have a top-level Cabinet Meeting with the President to discuss this whole matter. The agenda item was left as follows:

- a. Mann is to get the Crimmins staff hard at work on the Vance paper and on other alternative courses of action to include pros and cons, noise levels, estimated results, etc.

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b. Mann is to send around a draft OAS resolution which was prepared during Martin's time.

c. As to the specific paragraphs of the Vance memo, Bundy indicated his personal views (not an Administration commitment) that items 1 and 2a were OK; 2b for Cuban ships only; 3a should be intensified; 3b and 3c were directly connected to a separate black-list enterprise; 4 was OK. As for actions against Cuban subversion in Latin America, on paragraph 1 we should see just what our opportunities are, and on paragraph 2 CIA should determine just what we think the local traffic will bear and just what our capabilities might be.

Finally, after a very short discussion on low-level reconnaissance requirements for Cuba, General Taylor and Mr. McCone decided to pay close attention to high-level results on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, and to take a fresh reading on the matter on Monday. Action: DD/I to cover the low-level matter over the weekend, DD/P to ride herd on the activities generated by the Vance memo.

5. The next item was a very cursory review of the covert action programs for [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] Mr. Vance asked how we could measure the effectiveness of such actions and Mr. McCone pointed out to him that this could not be really adequately measured and gave all the reasons therefor. Mr. Vance stated that he was just getting broken into this type of activity and he would appreciate some briefings by the action officers. (It was subsequently arranged through Pete Jessup to have Colby and [redacted] make appointments with Secretary Vance specifically to discuss [redacted] operations and our Far Eastern operations. 25X1 25X1 25X1

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to prepare for me by no later than noon Monday the simplest, most concise, directive along the foregoing lines.

[Redacted] 25X1

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Distribution:

Original - DDCI


1 - Elder, [Redacted]

Paras 1-5 to [Redacted] DDP/SGO

Paras 6 & 7 - DD/S&T

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14 February 1964

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mac:

Here is the SNIE I just mentioned to you on the telephone. I have given it to Peter Jessup to hand-carry directly.

In view of its sensitivity, please limit its access to yourself, and as you see fit, the President.

Faithfully yours,

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

Attachment

SNIE 50-64 (Advance Copy),
dtd 12 Feb 64

MSC:bec

Orig - Adse (by hand to Mr. Jessup)

1 - Acting DCI

1 - O/DCI (Mr. Elder)

1 - DD/I

1 - AD/NE

1 - C/FE (via DD/P)

1 - ER (via Ex Dir)

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